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If employers believe females are more likely to separate from a job than males, 
efficient cost sharing of on-the-job-training implies that females will have higher
returns to tenure.  Becker and Lindsay (1994) argue that this is true empirically.
(1994). Updating the analysis we find that that there is no longer a difference in the
probability of leaving  jobs or in returns to tenure by gender.  Differences in contracts
to finance on the job training can no longer explain any of the “discrimination”
component in the gender wage gap.
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Section I - Introduction
The fact that women are less likely to be hired, or may self select out of jobs
requiring a lot of training, has been recognised as an important part of the male-female
wage differential.  Becker and Lindsay (1994) show, using Hashimoto's (1981) model
of efficient cost sharing of firm specific human capital, that women that do acquire firm
specific human capital should be expected to have greater returns to tenure than their
male counterparts. This is because women, particularly younger ones, are likely to
have greater variance of non-market productivity and hence are less likely to remain on
the job long-term than men.  Becker and Lindsay (1994) confirm their theoretical
argument empirically for the period 1983 to 1987 using  a panel of individuals
constructed from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) by showing that
females who stay in jobs for more than five years have greater returns to tenure than
their male counterparts.  
A number of other studies that have shown that, when experience and tenure
are controlled for, females have higher returns to tenure; see Hersh and Reagan (1997)
for a survey.  Coleman (1998), for instance, finds that females have higher returns to
tenure than males using the British New Earnings Survey.  Hersch and Reagan (1997)
provide an alternative to the human capital model as an explanation for women having
greater returns to tenure.  Using a model based on Lazear (1981), where deferred
compensation contracts are used to prevent workers shirking, they show that if men
are expected to stay on the job longer than women, the optimal contract offered to
men will have higher average wages and lower returns  to tenure than the female
contract.2 2
In this paper we demonstrate using the PSID that  while being male increased
the probability that one would stay in a long term job (more than five years) for most
of the 1980s, gender has since then played a much smaller and statistically insignificant
role in predicting job attachment.  This is consistent with the results of Light and
Manuelita  (1992) who, using the National Longitudinal Survey, found that for cohorts
of young men and women born in the early fourties and fifties females were more likely
than males to be quitters.  For cohorts born in the early fifties this was no longer true. 
In analysing the returns to tenure over the period 1983 to 1992, we find differences in
male and female tenure slopes to be smaller than reported by Becker and Lindsay
(1994) for the period 1983-87 and we find no noticable difference in tenure slopes in
1988-92.  Assuming that long term jobs are those jobs where firm specific human
capital is important, the evidence that the difference in probability of staying on the job
by gender is shrinking indicates that employers should now perceive women as a less
risky investment.  The fact that women's tenure slopes have become indistinguishable
from their male counterparts is consistent with this and implies that any differential
treatment of women in jobs involving the acquisition of significant amounts of human
capital is fading.
An implication of the result is that wage decompositions based on differences
in starting pay by gender substantially overstate "discrimination" since female stayers
wages will increase faster than their male counterparts according to the human capital
or Hersch and Reagan’s model.  We decompose the male female overall and starting
wage gap over time for those who remain in their job long-term and those who do not.
 We find that wages converge more for those in long-term jobs.  While differences in
tenure slopes may have been able to explain part of the “discrimination” component of3 3
 the gender wage gap, as argued in Becker and Lindsay (1994 and 1995), this is no
longer the case.
Section II - Data Construction
An important part of our study was to compile a data set that allowed us to
identify those jobs that entail the accumulation of substantial amounts of firm specific
human capital and that are thus occupied by ‘stayers’ rather than by ‘leavers’.  This
was constructed in the spirit of Becker and Lindsay (1994) using observations on
white household heads and their wives from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) 1981 to 1993 main data sets and 1994 to 1996 early releases.  The fundamental
variable used to categorise stayer and leaver observations is the report on job tenure. 
In their analysis of tenure reports provided by the PSID Brown and Light (1992) point
out that this variable is plagued with inconsistencies and we thus follow the
methodology of Becker and Lindsay (1994) to determine whether a tenure report is
consistent.  Accordingly, a tenure report is deemed to be consistent if it is (1) a report
of a new job, i.e., is positive but less than nineteen months, (2) lies within six to
eighteen months of a previous report, or (3), in case of what is deemed to be a layoff,
where the previous report is zero or missing but the current report lies within six to
eighteen months of a report from two years earlier.  An additional criterion we adopt is
that tenure must not exceed work experience.
Our definition of observations belonging to stayers crucially depends on
following the accumulation of tenure within jobs.  Accordingly, any observation of
employment in a job in which the person at any given point in time reaches at least five
years of tenure is determined to be that of a stayer.  In contrast, all those observations4 4
of employment in jobs which terminate before the end of five years are classified as
belonging to leavers.  In order not to include observations on jobs that have not had
the opportunity to be classified as belonging to either a stayer or leaver because they
had neither been terminated nor reached our five year threshold before the end of our
sample period, but at the same time also to only include observations from years which
can contain observations on both stayers and leavers, we classifiy observations using
data from the entire 1983 to 1996 sample but only include observations for our study
up until and including 1992.
As part of our analysis we attempted to replicate the results of Becker and
Lindsay (1994) for the period 1983 to 1987.   We meticulously tried to re-construct
their data set as described and used in their study.  This essentially involved dropping
all those observations on stayers and leavers in our data set for persons that had started
on a job in or some time after 1983 but before 1988, yet had not left the job in
question prior to 1988.   While our results for this subsample were generally, although
not always, qualitatively the same as those of Becker and Lindsay (1994), there were
clear discrepancies quantitatively, both in terms of sample size and regression
coefficients and their significance.   Despite meticulous re-checking we were unable to
account for these differences
2.  Given that this subsample of the data, however,
essentially only includes observations on stayers who commenced their job some time
before 1984 while all observations on leavers are of those who started and completed a
job spell between 1982 and 1988, we, for the pooled 1983-87 sample used in this
paper, decided to also include all observations in that period on those stayers and
                    
2 One possibility is that the wage data may divided by the CPI  to a different base period in Becker and
Lindsay.  This would matter since annual real incomes of less than $4000 are dropped.  If for example5 5
leavers who commenced their job over the 1983 to 1987 period but who could not
have been identified as such in the Becker and Lindsay study due to the lack of PSID
waves subsequent to 1987 at the time.   The pooled sample for the 1988 to 1992
period includes observations on all stayers and leavers for the remaining five years.
Our wage variable is the hourly wage provided by the PSID in log form,
deflated to 1983 dollars using the  Consumer Price Index.  Experience is only reported
intermittently or for new heads of households in the PSID and we thus, as suggested
by the PSID manual, constructed an experience variable by iterating forwards or
backwards, as necessary, from the appropriate year and considering any year in which
the person in question worked at least 1,500 hours as an additional year of full-time
experience.  We exclude observations where the experience variable is less than the
tenure variable.  The education variable is a step variable grouping years of education
and degrees into eight different categories and provided by the PSID for the years
1983 to 1987 and constructed accordingly for the years thereafter
3.  All other variables
used in this study are as provided by the PSID.
Finally, as was done by Becker and Lindsay (1994), we only include
observations of employment in which the person in that year had an income of at least
$4,000 and had worked at least 1,500 hours.  We differ from Becker and Lindsay in
that we exclude government and agricultural workers.  Descriptive statistics of these
for the two pooled sub-samples are given in the Appendix.
                                                                      
we use 1983 as the base period and Becker and Lindsay use 1987 then we would drop different
people.
3 We experimented with non-linear returns to education and with endogenising the education decision
but with little effect on the results.6 6
Section III - The Role of Gender in Job Attachment
Inherent in the use of Hashimoto’s (1980) model to explain differences in
tenure profiles between men and women on jobs with on-the-job-training is the
assumption that, because outside offers are likely to be better for women, the
probability of a woman, particularly a young one,  staying on the job may be lower
than for a man.  Previously, Becker and Lindsay (1994) have provided empirical
support for this contention for workers who started a new job in 1983.  Our extended
data set allows us to further investigate this issue over time.  In order to do so we
restrict our sample to those observations in which individuals start a new job over the
entire period 1983 to 1992, break this sample into two five year intervals, and use a
probit regression to examine how their characteristics affect the probability of whether
they will remain in that job for at least five years for these sub-periods separately.  The
probit estimates for our two five year sub-periods are reported as marginal
probabilities in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.  As Table 1 shows, our results for the
earlier pooled sample are roughly compatible to those found by Becker and Lindsay
(1994) for individuals starting a new job in 1983, although our sample also includes
individuals who started jobs for the 1984 to 1987 period.
4  The importance of gender
in predicting whether one was likely to become a stayer was large and statistically
significant; males were more likely than females to stay on their jobs for at least five
years.  Age also seems to serve as a significant predictor for one’s attachment to a job
and, as the interaction of age with the gender dummy variable suggests, this age effect
is particularly strong for women.  This, as already argued by Becker and Lindsay
                    
4 One should note that Becker and Lindsay (1994) report a sample size of almost over 3,000 for those
who started a new job over the 1982 to 1983 period.  Given that only about 7,000 households are
interviewed in each wave, this number seems unreasonably large.7 7
(1994), is probably because women’s child-rearing responsibilities fall, and hence their
labour force attachment grows, as they become older. 
The results in Table 2 suggest, however, that there has been a substantial
change in the role of gender as a predictor of job attachment over our sample period. 
The coefficient in the 1988-92 period of the male dummy variable is smaller than that
for the earlier period and statistically  not significant.  Additionally, while age is still an
important indicator of job attachment, there no longer seems to be a different age
effect for women.  These results thus suggest that since the late 1980s employers are
unlikely to use gender to make different predictions on  how long an individual will
remain in the job.
Table 1 - Probit Estimates of the Probability of Becoming a Stayer at the
Beginning of a New Job:  1983-87 Sample
Independent Variables dF/dx St. Err. Z P>|z|
Real Wage 0.000 0.000 2.69 0.007
Schooling 0.008 0.005 1.72 0.086
Male 0.152 0.048 2.88 0.004
Age 0.004 0.001 3.31 0.001
Male*Age -0.003 0.002 -2.10 0.011
Children 0.022 0.011 1.93 0.054
Male*Children -0.026 0.014 -1.86 0.063
Married 0.050 0.024 2.02 0.043





2 = 74.03 P > c
2 = 0.000
Pseudo R
2 = 0.03758 8
Table 2 - Probit Estimates of the Probability of Becoming a Stayer at the
Beginning of a New Job:  1988-92 Sample
Independent Variables dF/dx St. Err. Z P>|z|
Real Wage 0.000 0.000 2.33 0.020
Schooling 0.018 0.005 3.74 0.000
Male 0.056 0.053 1.05 0.293
Age 0.001 0.001 1.35 0.176
Male*Age -0.001 0.001 -0.55 0.584
Children -0.002 0.009 -0.18 0.860
Male*Children -0.005 0.012 -0.44 0.661
Married -0.063 0.020 3.02 0.003









 Section IV -  Comparison of Tenure Slopes for Job Stayers by Gender
A. Theoretical Background
Relying on the assumption that in general long term jobs require more firm
specific human capital, Becker and Lindsay (1994) outline four hypotheses that can
serve to test whether women bear a higher share of the cost of on-the-job-training:
Hypothesis 1:  Wage tenure profiles of female workers employed in firms requiring
firm specific human capital will rise more steeply than those of equally qualified male
employees.  Models of statistical discrimination, such as Lazear and Rosen (1990),
argue that firms that require on the job training will hire higher ability women than9 9
men.  This implies that steeper tenure profiles  could reflect the higher productivity of
higher ability women.  On its own, Becker and Lindsay (1994) argue, hypothesis 1 is a
weak test.
Hypothesis 2: Wages of female stayers will rise with tenure more than wages of
female leavers, since female stayers share the cost of firm specific training and female
leavers do not.  Becker and Lindsay (1994) test this hypothesis by comparing returns
to tenure for early stayers, where early stayers refers to stayers with less than five years
of tenure, to leavers of the same sex.  Since average tenure for early stayers is almost
four years for an early stayer and less than one and a half years for a leaver we
question the validity of this test.  Say for illustrative purposes that returns to tenure for
early stayers and for leavers are 1%.  A stayer’s wage will have increased by over 4%
by the end of four years while a leaver’s wage would be expected to increase by 1.5%
in the first year and a half after which he/she would typically start a new job and go
back to the starting wage.  A leaver’s wage would never be expected to rise by more
than 1.5% of the starting wage over the four years.  The test may also be invalid
because of the possibility of unobserved differences between stayers and leavers who
as the summary statistics suggest are very different groups.  For example, returns to
tenure could also reflect returns to general training which would be entirely paid for by
workers. If the importance of general training differed for stayers and leavers this test
is invalid.  The large returns to tenure for leavers (much larger than for stayers) who
have average tenure of less than eighteen months could reflect returns to basic general
training received on the job.10 10
Hypothesis 3: Tenure profiles of male and female leavers will exhibit no difference
since members of neither group share the cost of firm specific training.
Hypothesis 4: Sex based differences in tenure profiles will diminish with age.  As
women reach an age where their outside options are similar to males their tenure
slopes converge.  This hypothesis is tested by breaking the sample of leavers into those
under forty (young) and over forty (old) years of age and testing whether tenure slopes
are steeper for young women than for their male counterparts and doing the same for
older men and women.
Using their sample Becker and Lindsay's (1994) results supported all four of
their hypotheses.  It must be pointed out, however, that the empirical predictions of the
model proposed by Hersch and Reagan (1997), outlined earlier, would be difficult to
distinguish from the human capital model.  Not only do females have higher returns to
tenure, but a worker separating from their job would be expected to suffer a reduction
in earnings in both models  (the reduction in earnings suffered by displaced workers is
cited as evidence of the importance of specific human capital by  Topel (1991).  While
Hersch and Reagan (1997) plausibly argue that the assumption that males and females
have similar levels of human capital is unrealistic this does not mean the human capital
model is wrong.  If women do choose or are offered  less training than men then it
could be argued the observed higher returns to tenure for females understate the extent
to which women are obliged to pay for a higher share of their training costs.
It must also be noted that workers could choose between general and specific
human capital we might expect women with higher probabilities of leaving to opt more11 11
for general relative to firm specific human capital since a separation is costlier to a
worker with a lot of specific human capital.  Since human capital theory predicts the
worker paying for all general training , higher female returns to tenure may reflect
females choosing a bigger share of general relative to specific training than their male
counterparts.
B. Empirical Resullts
As argued above we question the validity of hypothesis 2.  To test the
remaining hypotheses we ran several log wage regression specifications to determine
and compare the returns to tenure for stayers and their appropriate sub-samples for our
two sample periods. The full regression results for male and female stayers are
reported in the Appendix.
5  A similar set of regressions were also run for old (over 40
years of age) and young stayers, for early and late stayers and for leavers (early stayers
are in the first five years of tenure).
6
Using our regression results we tested the  hypothesis that the difference in
tenure slopes was equal to zero for each of the above regressions.  The differences in
returns to tenure and the t statistics for these tests are reported in Table 3.
                    
5 The log wage regressions used in the tables below included industry dummies, although the
coefficients and standard errors are not reported here.  Becker and Lindsay (1994) also included age
and age squared in their regressions.  Given that experience and tenure with the employer are
controlled for we could not see a good theoretical rational for controlling for age. Age and experience
are highly correlated.
6 Descriptive statistics for young and old stayers by sex and sub-sample are also provided in the
Appendix.12 12
Table 3
* -  Difference in Tenure Coefficient between  Female and Males
7







































































*Standard Errors in Parenthesis
                    
7 These regressions are reported in detail in Appendix 1.  We differ from Becker and Lindsay (1994) 
since Government and agricultural workers are excluded and age and age squared are excluded as
regressors.  Given that experience and tenure are controlled for we do not see a good theoretical
rationale for including age.  Age and experience are highly correlated.  These modifications leave the
qualitative results unchanged.13 13
Table 4
* -  Difference in Tenure Coefficient between  Female and Males
reported in Becker and Lindsay (1994)




































*Standard Errors in Parenthesis
Our results show that in the earlier period the result that tenure slopes were
steeper for women are much weaker than in Becker and Lindsay (1994).  By contrast,
returns to tenure are very similar for males and females in the latter period and we fail
to reject the null of parameter equality for all the regression specifications.  To further
investigate this matter we pooled our two samples and included year dummies and year
dummies interacted with the tenure variable; these are shown in Table 4.
8  The results
indicate that while the returns to tenure for male stayers remained relatively stable over
our sample period, those of female stayers fell substantially, to result in an overall
convergence of the two.
                    
8 The coefficient estimates and their standard errors for the year dummies are not reported here but
are obtainable from the authors.14 14
 Table 5 - Estimates of Tenure Effects for Stayers, by Sex
Male Female
Intercept 1.197 (0.035) 0.905 (0.066)
Experience 0.024 (0.002) 0.020 (0.002)
Experience
2 -0.005 (0.000) -.000 (0.000)
Tenure83 0.015 (0.001) 0.023 (0.006)
Tenure84 0.012 (0.002) 0.016 (0.006)
Tenure85 0.012 (0.001) 0.017 (0.004)
Tenure86 0.015 (0.002) 0.017 (0.003)
Tenure87 0.017 (0.002) 0.017 (0.003)
Tenure88 0.014 (0.002) 0.014 (0.003)
Tenure89 0.013 (0.002) 0.012 (0.003)
Tenure90 0.011 (0.002) 0.013 (0.003)
Tenure91 0.011 (0.002) 0.009 (0.003)
Tenure92 0.010 (0.002) 0.011 (0.002)
Schooling 0.157 (0.003) 0.150 0.005
Children -0.004 (0.004) -0.033 (0.007)
Married 0.026 (0.015) 0.004 (0.014)
R
2 0.401 0.394
N = 6,104 2,930
It was demonstrated in Table 3 that our data supports Hypothesis 3 in both
periods and Hypothesis 4 in the earlier period.  Tenure slopes for older males and
females and leavers  are practically identical in both sub periods.  In the later period
young females still have steeper tenure slopes than young males but the differences are
much smaller quantitatively and the t statistics from the test of parameter equality
suggest that the differences are statistically insignificant.15 15
As noted earlier, we were unable to replicate Becker and Lindsay's results
quantitatively and in particular there results for early stayers differ from ours.  The
generally higher returns to tenure for early relative to late stayers indicates that returns
to tenure are non-linear.  The fact that gender differences in returns to tenure  are large
and statistically significant for young workers (in the 1983-87 period at least), but not
for early stayers supports the human capital interpretation of the difference in returns
to tenure over Hersch and Reagan’s (1997) model.   In summary we do not find
support for hypothesis 1 in either period.  Hypothesis three and four  are supported in
the first period.  In the later period only hypothesis 3 is supported.
Section V - The Male Female Wage Differential for Stayers and Leavers
A question that naturally arises from the analysis is whether differences in
tenure profiles are important in terms of explaining the male female wage differential.
Becker and Lindsay (1994) and Becker and Lindsay (1995) argue that differences in
starting pay by gender significantly overstate the gender pay gap since low female
starting pay reflects higher female training costs.  We can see from the results in Tables
3 and 4 that our results indicate that differences in tenure slopes are not important in
terms of understanding the gender pay gap.  To illustrate this in a rough and ready
way, consider an identical male and female stayer starting in identical jobs.  The female
gets a lower starting salary than the male.  How much of this difference in starting pay
could be explained by differences in tenure slopes where the female catches up in time .
 The biggest differences in tenure slopes are for young stayers who are aged around 32
on average.  The results in Table 3 indicate that for 1983-87 at most about a 9%16 16
starting pay differential could be explained away (1.3% for eight years when the
workers become old and tenure slopes converge).  While Becker and Lindsay’s (1994
and 1995) results  for early stayers could explain a wage differential of about 16% at
most between male and female starters.  All of our results indicate that returns to
tenure  have no role in explaining gender wage differentials in the later period
In the earlier period gender wage differentials are similar for all stayers and
stayers who are starting on the job (that is in their first 18 months of tenure).  If the
convergence of tenure slopes reflects a reduction in the higher risk of hiring women
stayers, then starting pay should converge also.   While we look at wage
decompositions below to examine this issue, ultimately the small number of starting
stayers in particular, means that we cannot have confidence in the changes in average
wages for starting  stayers that we observe.  An alternative approach is to compare
stayers with leavers since there are more observations in these groups.   We would
expect the leaver gender wage gap to fall by less than for stayers if some of the stayer
wage gap is explained by differences in returns to tenure which are falling.
  The descriptive statistics for stayers and leavers by gender provided in the
Appendix indicate that stayers are fundamentally different from leavers.  Stayers tend
to be on average older, more experienced, more educated and have a greater incidence
of marriage than leavers.  There are, however, also significant differences even within
the two samples.  Male stayers, for example are on average, older, more experienced,
more educated and have a greater incidence of marriage than women.  In Figure 1 we
Graph the male female wage differential by year for all stayers and starting stayers.  As
can be seen, the wage differential has fallen for all groups over time but more so for
leavers than stayers.   In the analysis below the data are pooled into two groups 1983-17 17
87 and 1988-92.  This is not desirable as Figure 1 shows considerable variation within
these sub-periods.  Unfortunately this choice along with the small number of regressors
was dictated by the small sample size of starting stayers in particular.
Figure 1: Gender Wage differential for Stayers and Leavers over Time
year





Of course, constructing simple means even over time is only a crude way of
comparing differences  in pay between males and females.  As the large literature on
pay discrimination has shown, differences in individual characteristics go some way in
explaining wage differentials. The decompositions in the tables below are based on
regressions of log wages on experience, education and tenure for male and female, by
stayers and leavers.  The regressions for starting stayers excludes tenure The









t = + b (1)







t = + b (2)
 where W is the log wage X a vector of characteristics, $ a vector of  returns to the
characteristics and V an error term.  One can then use the Oaxaca (1973)
decomposition to break down the wage differential into two parts: a  component that is
due to differences in returns to characteristics  ($s.) and a component explained by
differences in characteristics (Xs), evaluated at the non-discriminatory price
9:





t = + $ $ b b (3)
One can also examine the change in the wage differential over time.  Following
Schmidt (1998) the change in the wage differential  between time period 0 and 1 can
be decomposed into four parts:
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The four terms measure the effect of changes in the difference in wage structure
between males and females over time on the change in the male female wage19 19
differential, the impact of changes in the baseline (female) characteristics on the change
in the male female wage differential, the effect of changes in the difference in
characteristics between males and females over time on the change in the male female
wage differential, and the impact of changes in the baseline (male) prices on the change
in the male female wage differential, respectively.  Schmidt (1998)  develops a method
to calculate the variances of the components of the Oaxaca decomposition and we
extend this in Appendix2  to calculate standard errors for each of the components of
the above decomposition 
10.
























                                                                      
9 There is a literature discussing  the wage structure that should be chosen to represent the non-
discriminatory price, see Oaxaca and Ransom (1994).  We opt for the most common course of
adopting the male price.
10 A limitation in the analysis for calculating the standard errors is the underlying assumption that 
the X’s are fixed.  We will see later that in some cases the changes in mean characteristics in the
second and third component of the decomposition have large standard errors and are statistically
insignificant.20 20
1983-87 and 1988-92 Stayers: Schmidt Decomposition











1983-87 and 1988-92 Leavers: Schmidt Decomposition











1983-87 and 1988-92 Starting Pay Stayers: Schmidt Decomposition























































Standard errors in parenthesis.21 21












































Standard errors in parenthesis.
































Standard errors in parenthesis.
While the wage gap for starters does not fall as we would expect the standard
error terms on the Schmidt decomposition for starting stayers indicate that the
numbers are very unreliable.  The tables for stayers and leavers are consistent with our
story.  The stayer wage gap falls by  more than for leavers and this does not seem to be
driven by differences in changes in characteristics. 22 22
Section VI - Conclusion
Our analysis of the gender wage gap and returns to firm specific human capital
shows that there have been significant changes since the early 1980s.  Firstly, the
likelihood that a woman is a more risky investment for job specific human capital
investment has been falling.  Additionally, returns to tenure for females on long-term
jobs,  are converging to those of their male counterparts, while for most of the 1980s
they had  been  higher.   Differences in returns to tenure can no longer explain part of
the  male female differential in starting pay.23 23
Appendix 1 - Descriptive Statistics and Regression Estimates
Descriptive Statistics for Stayers, by Sex and Sample
1983-87 1988-92
Variable Male Female Male Female
ln(Real Wage) 2.39 (0.44) 2.01 (0.41) 2.32 (0.50) 1.99 (0.45)
Age 37.96 (10.45) 38.72 (11.0) 38.30 (9.55) 38.61 (10.30)
Experience 18.27 (10.61) 15.04 (8.79) 18.26 (9.76) 14.84 (8.42)
Tenure 10.44 (8.29) 7.89 (6.17) 9.61 (7.95) 7.64 (6.31)
Schooling 5.26 (1.61) 4.94 (1.38) 5.35 (1.60) 5.09 (1.42)
Children 1.20 (1.19) 0.82 (1.04) 1.26 (1.23) 0.84 (1.02)
Married 0.87 (0.33) 0.60 (0.49) 0.86 (0.35) 0.70 (0.46)
N = 2,944 1,109 3,160 1,821
Descriptive Statistics for Leavers, by Sex and Sample
1983-87 1988-92
Variable Male Female Male Female
ln(Real Wage) 2.06 (0.50) 1.75 (0.44) 2.03 (0.55) 1.74 (0.48)
Age 31.89 (8.99) 31.20 (9.03) 33.49 (9.39) 33.76 (9.12)
Experience 11.96 (9.08) 8.54 (6.88) 13.01 (9.22) 9.79 (7.20)
Tenure 1.16 (1.06) 1.18 (1.01) 1.23 (1.04) 1.23 (1.00)
Schooling 5.12 (1.63) 5.16 (1.43) 5.13 (1.71) 5.06 (1.46)
Children 0.98 (1.10) 0.76 (1.03) 1.06 (1.19) 0.95 (1.15)
Married 0.76 (0.43) 0.52 (0.50) 0.72 (0.45) 0.64 (0.48)
N = 1,636 1,151 1,830 1,69324 24
Descriptive Statistics for Stayers, by Age and Sex: 1983-87
Old Young
Variable Male Female Male Female
ln(Real Wage) 2.49 (0.47) 2.00 (0.42) 2.35 (0.42) 2.02 (0.41)
Age 50.58 (7.01) 50.92 (6.98) 31.86 (4.88) 31.43 (4.80)
Experience 30.73 (7.77) 22.36 (9.34) 12.26 (5.17) 10.67 (4.51)
Tenure 16.70 (10.55) 11.42 (7.65) 7.06 (4.80) 5.79 (3.75)
Schooling 4.89 (1.82) 4.52 (1.42) 5.45 (1.46) 5.19 (1.30)
Children 0.75 (1.02) 0.35 (0.72) 1.42 (1.21) 1.10 (1.11)
Married 0.90 (0.31) 0.55 (0.50) 0.86 (0.34) 0.63 (0.48)
N = 959 415 1,985 69425 25
Descriptive Statistics for Stayers, by Age and Sex: 1988-92
Old Young
Variable Male Female Male Female
ln(Real Wage) 2.40 (0.55) 1.96 (0.46) 2.28 (0.46) 2.00 (0.44)
Age 48.80 (6.98) 49.69 (6.90) 32.58 (4.65) 32.05 (5.03)
Experience 28.64 (7.71) 21.59 (8.74) 12.60 (4.89) 10.84 (4.96)
Tenure 14.60 (9.92) 10.57 (7.92) 6.88 (4.79) 5.90 (4.28)
Schooling 5.21 (1.81) 4.84 (1.42) 5.42 (1.47) 5.23 (1.40)
Children 0.93 (1.13) 0.46 (0.79) 1.44 (1.25) 1.06 (1.08)
Married 0.90 (0.29) 0.64 (0.48) 0.83 (0.37) 0.74 (0.44)
N = 1,116 678 2,044 1,14326 26
Estimates of Tenure Effect for Stayers, by Sex and Sample
1983-87 1988-92
Variable Male Female Male Female
lntercept 1.28 (0.03) 1.13 (0.06) 0.10 (0.04) 0.87 (0.05)
Exp. 0.03 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00)
Exp.
2 -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)
Tenure 0.01 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Schooling 0.14 (0.00) 0.13 (0.01) 0.18 (0.00) 0.17 (0.00)
Children -0.01 (0.01) -0.04 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Married 0.02 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.34 (0.02)
R
2 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.04
N = 2,944 1,109 3,160 1,82127 27
Appendix 2 - Standard Errors for Components of the Schmidt Decomposition
 To simplify the notation the decomposition in (4) is rewritten as:
D D D D D W W
m m f
1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0
- = - + +
+ -
(*)( $ $ ) (**) $




We also define a number of vectors.  If n is the number of regressors (0) is an
[1, (n+1)] row vector of zeros.  The vectors of estimated coefficients from the four
regressions are stacked into a [4*(n+1) , 1] column  vector b=[( $ )'( $ )'( $ )'( $ )]' b b b b m f m f
1 1 0 0 . 
The above decomposition and its four components can be written respectively as.
D D W W X X X X b S b m f m m
1 0 1 1 0 1
1 - = - - = [( )'( )'( )'( )']   (A2)
(*)( $ $ ) [(*)( *)(*)( *)] D D b b
1 0
2 - = - - = b S b     (A3)
(**) $ [(**)( **)( )( )] Db = - = 0 0 3 b S b    (A4)
(***) $ [( )( )(***)( )] bm b S b
0
4 0 0 0 = =    (A5)
(****)( $ $ ) [(****)( )( )(****)] b b m f b S b
1 0
5 0 0 - = =    (A6)
Next we define the variance covariance matrix for b as V(b).  The estimated variance
for the five terms above is then SiV(b)Si’ where 1=1..5.28 28
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